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, Sun, 16 Sep 2001 00:00:06
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stratfor.com
September 15, 2001
Russia's View, Russia's Options
The Kremlin -- a crucial potential ally in the United States newly declared
war on terrorism -- is debating the proper course to take. Siding with
Washington could mean a golden opportunity to have the United States
acknowledge Russia's geopolitical interests in the former Soviet Union, but
it also presents dangerous potential for future domestic troubles. For
President Vladimir Putin, the short-term benefits of supporting a U.S.
campaign in Afghanistan are likely to win over the very real and reasonable
long-term strategic fears.
Analysis
One of the elements of U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism will be a
sustained campaign to break Afghanistan's Taliban regime. This has both
operational and symbolic value: It denies sanctuary to those suspected of
organizing the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States while serving as a
deterrent to other regimes that might provide -- or consider providing --
sanctuary. Thus, whatever else the United States does, Afghanistan is going
to be hit, and hard. There will be two targets: Osama bin Laden himself and
as important, the Taliban government.
Carrying out a sustained mission, however, will be extremely difficult for
the United States. The United States could strike at Afghanistan from the air
using ship-launched cruise missiles and long-range aircraft -- such as B-52s
flying out of the United States or Diego Garcia -- but that does not
constitute the foundation for a sustained attack. For that, tactical aircraft
in large numbers must be based around Afghanistan. In addition, special
operations forces must be available on the ground to carry out missions that
cannot be conducted from the air.
Russia could provide the answers for Washington's toughest logistical
problems.
The United States has two problems. First, it does not have tactical airbases
in place for a sustained air attack on Afghanistan. The United States has no
aircraft in the region of Afghanistan, and bases in Turkey and Saudi Arabia
are too far away. Sorties would be cut dramatically, even if the problem of
mid-air refueling over Iran were solved. The same problem applies to special
operations troops.
Second, even if any nearby states permit the United States to base fighter
aircraft in country, building up enough forces and -- most important -- the
logistical infrastructure needed would take months. Until then, only
small-scale operations are possible.
Russia, however, is in a position to begin a sustained air offensive very
quickly. Its special operations forces have substantial experience -- albeit
not particularly happy experience -- in Afghanistan. The Russians could use
still-operational bases in Tajikistan to launch air strikes. Indeed, the
Russians still have an airbase in northern Afghanistan -- Bagram, in the area
controlled by the Northern Alliance, where Russian transports still fly
regular support missions. The Northern Alliance remains effective even though
its leader has been killed by Taliban agents.
Russian participation would allow the United States to strike at the Taliban
much more quickly than it otherwise could. Russia could also provide
Washington with bases for American aircraft and special forces down the road.
Russia's defense minister has publicly stated that the country is not
prepared to participate in this war. Sources close to Russian intelligence,
however, tell STRATFOR that the debate on Russia's course is intense, and
that President Vladimir Putin in particular is intrigued by the possibilities
of cooperating with the United States. These reports make a lot of sense.
Russia's concern has long been that it lost all leverage with the United
States after the Cold War. Its financial and geopolitical needs could not be
satisfied without American cooperation, but the Americans, having little need
of the Russians, were not cooperating. On one level, the new war provides
Russia with a golden opportunity.
Moscow has at least three compelling reasons to participate in Washington's
war on terrorism.
First, there is no question that if Russia in essence rented out its air
force for an Afghan campaign, Moscow could ask for massive financial
concessions from the United States and the West -- and would probably get
them in the form of underwriting the operation. Thus, several financing
streams would open to the Russians: The multilateral spigot of the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund would undoubtedly be turned on, as would
informal pressure for Western banks to support Russia's infrastructure.
Direct payments to support Russian military operations would also help revive
the capabilities of the armed forces.
Second, and as important, Putin could easily link the air campaign with
Russia's geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The
Russians have worked very hard to link the events of Sept. 11 with Chechnya.
They have argued that the same people are behind both conflicts, and that a
successful counter-attack will require a solution to their Chechen problem.
Since the Chechen issue is closely linked to the status of the entire
Caucasus region, an American concession on this point would inevitably lead
to the imposition of a Russian sphere of influence there, to say the least.
Moreover, a sustained Afghan war would have to emanate from Central Asia. The
security of Russian forces there would require the United States to accept
the imposition of Russian security measures in a region where U.S. oil
companies have close working relations with local governments not
particularly eager to fall under Russian sway. Nevertheless, the United
States could not simultaneously ask for Russian participation and deny the
Russians the right to act with politico-military prudence.
Third, Russia would clearly position itself as an integral part of the
Western alliance system -- a political windfall for Putin. Russian liberals,
who could normally be expected to oppose any revival of Russian involvement
in Afghanistan, would see this particular case as an opportunity for linkage
with the West and hence, for increased liberalization. Russian conservatives,
who would normally be appalled at working for the United States, would see
this not only as an opportunity to move toward the reestablishment of the
geographical framework of the Soviet Union, but would undoubtedly receive a
pledge to bar further NATO expansion in return for Russian participation.
But the Kremlin also has longterm reasons to balk at participation in the war
on terrorism.
Russians are extremely wary of the new Powell doctrine, which has stated that
the future litmus test for U.S. relations with any other country will be
their behavior toward the United States in this war. They see it as the
United States using the war to reshape the international system to its
benefit. In recent months, the world had shifted from a unipolar model to
something much more multipolar, with China and Russia both resisting American
authority. The current crisis, paradoxically, increases the American capacity
for imposing its order on the world.
Moreover, Russia is already a major target for radical Islamic terrorists,
and could become the main one. If Moscow actively supports Washington in the
upcoming campaign, its geographic proximity to hotbeds of Islamic
fundamentalism, its relative political weakness and even its demographics
create the potential for longterm threats. Murat Murtazin, rector of Moscow's
Islamic College, estimates that 20 million of Russia's 145 million people are
Muslim. Birth rates for Muslims exceed those of ethnic Russians and other
segments, according to the Environmental and Health Atlas of Russia. The
growing Muslim population would make waging war on Islamists -- even of the
terrorist ilk -- dicey.
Last but not least, Russian strategists fear America will get what it wants
in the region at the expense of thousands of Russian soldiers' lives. Afghans
are extremely tough fighters who have already beaten off British and Soviet
invasions.
The Russians are therefore struggling with two imperatives. On one hand, they
do not want a world dominated by American power. On the other hand, if the
world is to be dominated by American power, they certainly want a front-row
seat. Some in Russia argue that this is a grand opportunity to secure that
seat. Others say that sowing the short-term wind will reap a long-term
whirlwind. If the United States wins this war, its gratitude will be
short-lived, and its interests will not be Russia's.
We think a debate is raging inside the Kremlin on the proper course. We also
suspect that the short-term benefits of supporting a U.S. campaign in
Afghanistan will ultimately win out over the very real and reasonable
long-term strategic fears. Therefore, as the United States moves toward a war
with Afghanistan, the world may well see rare joint U.S.-Russian military
operations. There is a convergence of interest here worth observing.
posted by 207.181.7...
, Sun, 16 Sep 2001 00:00:06, Sun, 16 Sep 2001 16:57:53
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